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Because  external  debt  repayments  have  distributional  implica-
tions  in the debtor  country,  domestic  politics  affect  the formula-
tion of the  debt  strategy.  And  domestic  opposition  to heavy  debt
repayment  can be a blessing  for debt negotiators  - who are
likely  to get better  deals  with creditors  as a result.
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Diwan  and Verdier  explore  how  the formulation  Diwan  and Verdier  argue that:
of debt  repayment  policies  can be affected  by the
nature of the decisionmakers  and the strength  of  * Governments  backed by constituencies  from
various interest  groups.  nontraded  goods  sectors  are more  likely to
default
Most models  of debtor countries  ume that
all individuals  in the economy  are alike or that  *  Without  capital  mobility,  capitalists  in
gainers  compensate  losers;  most analysis  ignores  import  substitution  will tend to oppose the
political  considerations. But recent  electoral  repayment  sought by capitalists  in export  promo-
campaigns  in Latin America  suggest  that debt  tion. Workers' interests  will depend  on imports'
policy  may have important  distributive  implica-  share  in their consumption  basket.
tions.
* With capital  mobility,  labor will  oppose the
Diwan and Verdier  argue  that small penalties  extent  of debt  repayment  sought by capitalists  in
can be enough  to deter default  if they  hurt the  both import  substitution  and export  promotion
interests  of groups  that are closely  associated  sectors.
with policymakers  - especially  when the costs
of debt service  can be shifted  to groups  with less  * Self-fulfilling  external  default  with heavy
influence  on decisionmaking.  capital  flight  is more likely when the default
penalty  is inelastic  and when a left-wing  govern-
They focus  on how debt  policy affects  ment  is in power.
domestic  conflict  between  labor  and capital,
between  import  substitution  and export  promo-  * Assuming  perfect bargaining,  governments
tion sectors,  and between  traded and nontraded  with constituencies  that oppose  heavy  debt
goods  sectors. Debt service  requires  austerity,  repayment  can get better deals with creditors
which is distributed  unequally;  capital  is better  than  governments  supported  by groups  that favor
able than labor  to move abroad  and thus evade  more  debt adjustment. Opposition  at home  can
taxes  - and with the expectation  of higher  be a blessing  for debt negotiators,  as could  be
taxes,  capital  is more likely  to flee, reducing  seen by the last Venezuelan  rescheduling  agrec-
capital  stocks. Meanwhile,  to generate  foreign  ment (which  followed  street riots over price
resources,  traded  goods must  expand,  which  increases)  and the recent Mexican  debt relief
requires  a real devaluation;  this generates  a  agreement  (which  followed  a very close clec-
conflict  with nontraded  goods.  tion).
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How  do domest  politics  affect  debt  external  repayments  by highly
indebted  coun  -ies? The recent  literature  on sovereign  debt does  not  provide
much light  on this  question.  Instead,  it  has produced  important  conceptual
insights  about  the  incentives  of an apolitical  country  to service  its  foreign
loans.  With sovereign  immunity,  the  government  of a country  that  has lost  access
to  voluntary  credits  can  bargain  with its  creditors  for  a debt settlement.  The
bargaining  outcome  will  depend  on characteristics  of the  creditors,  the  debtor,
and  possibly  of third  parties.  From  the  debtor's  point  of view,  debt  policy
trades  off the  disutility  of debt  service  against  the  cost  of default--the
consequence  of direct  or indirect  penalties  such  as reduced  access  to the
2 international  capital  and  goods  markets
Usual  models  of debtor  countries  assume  implicitly  that  all individuals
in the  economy  are  alike  or that  the  gainers  compensate  the  losers,  thus
flushing  out  of the  analysis  all  political  considerations.  In contrast,  the
recent  electoral  campaigns  in  Latin  America  suggest  that  debt policy  may  have
important  distributive  implications.  The  goal  of this  paper  is to explore  how
the  formulation  of debt  repayment  policies  can  be affected  by the  nature  of the
decision-makers  and  by the  strength  of the  various  interest  groups.
The  paper  first  focuses  on the  differential  effects  of both the  costs  of
default  and  of repayments  on various  domestic  interest  groups,  in the  absence  of
redistribution  between  gainers  and losers.  The analysis  is  helpful  in solving  an
issue  that  has often  puzzled  economists:  how can  the  seemingly  relatively  small
costs  of default  support  international  lending  and deter  the  highly  indebted
countries  from  defaulting?  We argue  that  much insight  can  be gained  by
identifying  the  groups  that  gain from  a default  and those  that  lose.  Small
ZSee  for  eg  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1989)  for  such  an analysis  from  a debtor
"country"  perspective.-3-
penalties  can  be sufficient  to deter  default  when they  hurt the interests  of
groups  that  are closely  associated  with  policy-makers,  especially  when the  costs
of debt service  can  be shifted  to groups  that  have less  impact  on the  decision-
making  process.
WUe  highlight  three  factors  that  contribute  to conflicts  of interests  in
the formulation  of the  national  debt  policy.  First,  we explore  the  effect  of
conflicts  of interest  that  are  due  to two  features  of public  choice  that  are
specific  to  debt adjustment  policies:  (i)  Because  the  traded  goods  sectors  needs
to expand  in  order  to generate  the  foreign  resources  needed  for  the  external
transfer,  a real  devaluation  is required.  This  generates  conflicts  of interest
between  the  traded  and  non  traded  goods  sectors,  an issue  that  we analyze  in
section  I in the  context  of a  model  of a small  dependent  economy;  (ii)  Default
and the  economic  consequences  in  terms  of trade  orientation  and  market  access
affect  the  export  and  the  import  substitution  sectors  differently,  creating
additional  conflicts.  This is studied  in section  II in the  context  of a
traditional  trade  model.  The extent  of capital  mobility  turns  out to be a
decisive  factor  in the  analysis.
Second,  we focus  (in  section  III)  on the  distributional  effects  of
austerity.  When the  foreign  debt is  government  owned  (as  in  most LDCs),  the
internal  transfer  from  the  private  and to the  public  sector  that is required  for
debt service  imposes  austerity  in  ways that  affect  different  interest  groups
differently.  We focus  on the  conflict  of interest  between  capital  and labor  that
stem  from the  differential  abilities  of these  factors  of production  to  move
abroad  and  thus,  to evade  taxes.  Besides  constraining  government  action,
potential  capital  mobility  can generate  powerful  forces  in  the  economy  through
its  effects  on expectations.  In  particular,  the  expectation  of  higher  taxes  on
capital  can  become  self-fulfilling,  thus  reducing  capital  stocks  considerably.
However,  good  equilibria  can  also  exist.  While  this  possibility  of multiple-4-
equilibria  has  been studied  elsewhere  (Helpman  [19881,  Eaton t19871,  Calvo
t19881),  we argue  here that  the  instability  of expectational  equilibria  is
affected  by the  identity  of the  decision-makers.  In  particular,  we display  an
example  in  which  the  multiplicity  of equilibria  can  disappear  when the  policy-
makers  are  perceived  to  be sufficient:ly  pro-capital.
Third,  the  nature  of the  debtor's  government  can  affect  its  ability  to
bargain  with its  creditors.  In  particular,  we develop  (in  section  IV)  the
argument  that  governments  that  support  interest  groups  that  have larger
incentives  to default  can  ultimately  obtain  better  deals  with creditors  than
governments  supported  by groups  that  favor  more debt  adjustment.
I.  Exchange  Rate Policy  and  Debt  Adjustment
To repay  foreign  creditors,  it is  not sufficient  for  a goverr.ment  to
raise  funds  domestically;  those  funds  must  also  be converted  into foreigr.
currency.  This increases  the  demand  for  foreign  exchange  in the  domestic  econom±y
and thus  its  price.  This  relative  price  change  hurts  the  non traded  goods  sector
and  benefits  the  traded  goods  sectors.  As a result,  the  extent  of debt
adjustment  will depend  upon the  way in  which  the  government  trades  off  the
welfare  of two  sectors.  Moreover,  as pointed  out  by Rodrik  (1988),  structural
parameters  such  as the  effect  of devaluations  on the  government  budget  also
matter.
To illustrate,  consider  a small  dependent  economy  with two  sectors  (in
the  spirit  of Dornbush  [1973])  producing  respectively  a traded  (T)  and a non
traded  good (N).  For simplicity,  we take  labor  to  be the  only  factor  of
production  (the  T sector  is  endowed  with  LT and  the  N sector  with LN units  of
labor),  and  we assume  that  labor  is sector  specific  (we  allow  labor  mobility  in
the  next  section).  Production  functions  are  linear,  and  are  given  by qi  aiLi,
i-(N,L).  The  price  of N good is  denoted  by p and that  of the  T good  by ep?,
where  e is the  exchange  rate (PT  is determined  in the  international  market  and.5-
is thus  taken  as given  in the  analysis).  We take  the  T good  as the  numeraire  and
set  epT-1.  Both  the  traded  go d price  PT  as well as each  sector's  wage rate  arA
determined  competitively.  Wages  are  represented  by wi,  with i-(L,N).
To neutralize  effects  due  to differential  spending  patterns,  we further
assume  that  agents  have  homothetic  preferences  represented  by:
(1)  Ui(p,Yi)  - Y1/E(p), with:  E'>O,  E"<O,
where  Y,  - wili(l-t),  i-(T,N),  represents  income,  and  t is an income  tax,  the
sole instrument  that  provides  public  finance  for  debt  service.  Differentiating
(1),  and  using  the  notation  x-dx/x,  we have:  ap-  '2 - p where  a  - E'p/E
represents  the  share  of non traded  goods  in the  consumption  basket.
Consider  that  a fixed  external  debt  obligation  D is  due, and that  this
obligation  can  be either  completely  or  partially  repaid.  In case of partial
repayment,  the  production  functions  are assumed  to shrink,  becoming  Qi  - qj(B)
where  ((O)<l,  ((D)-l,  d'(B)>O  and  ("(B)>O,  i-(T,N).  This is  a quite  general
represent!tion  of the  consequences  of partial  default,  and it  can  be defended  in
various  ways.  For ,,ample,  penalties  can  be imposed  in the  wake  of partial
defaults;  these  penalties  can  be automatic  as when  bil'teral  creditors  must, for
internal  reasons,  reduce  transfers  and  aid  when their  national  commercial  banks
are  not  being  serviced. 3 Assuming  that  the  penalty  is  elastic  in the  amount
repaid  B is  not necessary  for  our  discussion,  but  adds  realism.  We take  the  view
that  limited  default  can  be an optimal  strategy  for  indebted  countries  because
debtors  may  want to default  on some  types  of loans  but  not others. The
assumption  that  the  penalty  affects  both  sectors  equally  is relaxed  in the
3Alternatively  and  with  perfect  bargaining,  the  penalty  is  not imposed  ex-post
but  rather  it determines  the  debt  settlement  given  by the  bargaining  proces.
We discuss  the  first  interpretation  here  and the  second  in section  IV.
4Thus,  ((B)  may  be discontinuous,  exhibiting  various  threshold  levels.-6-
discussion.
Equilibrium  given  B and t
With perfect  competition  in tl-  labor  market,  equilibrium  wages  are
given  by wT  aT((B)  and  wN - paN,(B).  Sectoral  and  aggregate  incomes  are then:
YT  (  -t)  (B) qT  I  YN  p ( l-t)  (B)  qN  and  Y =YT  +  YN.
Using  Roy's identities,  we can obtain  total  demand  N for  the  non-traded  good:
N - NT +  NN  -[U'/U'T]TU'/U'
(  (l-t) (B)  a(p) f(qT/P)  +  qNI
Equating  total  demand  for  non-traded  goods,  N, to the  total  supply  qN,  it is
possible  to solve  for  the  real  exchange  rate  p:
(2)  p - [a(p)  (qT/qN)  (l-t)]  /  [1  - a(p)(I-t)].
In general,  the  real  exchange  rate  is a decreasing  function  of the tax  rate  t.
To increase  the  government  tradable  revenue,  a devaluation  iL .eeded. 6
Optimal  Taxes  and  Debt  Repayment
We can  now  compute  a debt-service  possibility  curve  which  will generally
be a concave  function  in the (B,t)  space.  To see  the  effects  at work,  consider
the  government  budget  constraint:
5Differentiating  (2)  with respect  to t: ap/8t  - -p/(l-t)tl-a(l-t)-M]  where
A-a'p/a  is the  elasticity  of a  with respect  to  p. The expression  is  negative
when A is negative,  that  is,  when substitution  effects  dominate  the income
effect  (so  that  the  share  of  N in consumption  decreases  with the  real  exchange
rate  p).
6When  the  penalty  affects  both sectors  differentially,  the  real exchange  rate
is  given  by: p' ptT(B)/WN(B),  where  p is  given  in (2),  and  (i(B)  is the  share
of output  in  sector  i that  is  available  for  consumption  when B is  paid out.-7-
(3)  B - tY - t [QT +  PQN]  t ((B)  [qT +  PqN]s
Equation  (3)  implicitly  defines  B(t),  the  debt-service  possibility  curve.
Differentiating,  we have:
(4)  dB/dt  [  Y (1 + t sN  ept)  ]  /  [  1  ]
where  sN - ((B)pq%/Y  represents  the  share  of the  non-traded  sector  in total
income,  ept  =  (ap/8t)(t/p) represents  the (negative)  elasticity  of the  real
exchange  rate  with respect  to the  tax  rate,  and  efB  - Bt'/f  represents  the
elasticity  of the  penalty  with respect  to the  amount  repaid.
Three  effects  are  at work:  a marginal  increase  in the tax  rate  directly
increases  tax  receipts  B by  Y. There  is  however  an additional  effect  that  goes
the  other  way: as t rises,  the  real  exchange  rate  deteriorates. 7 As a result,
the  tax  revenue  in the  non-tradable  sector  is negatively  affected.  If the
elasticity  ep,  weighted  by the  share  of the  N sector  in the  economy  is smaller
than  -1,  tax  revenue  decreases  in the  non-tradable  sector.  We pursue  below the
more  realistic  case  where is,  eptl 5  1.  Thus,  the  larger  the  non-traded  sector
is  and the  larger  the  effect  of taxes  on the  real  exchange  rate,  the  larger  the
needed  tax  rate (and  real  devaluation)  for  the  government  to  be able to  collect
an additional  dollar  in traded  revenue.  Finally,  the  net  effect  of these  two
forces  is  multiplied  because  net  output  ((B)Y  increases  with B,  which itself
7In this  simple  set-up,  p is  not  affected  by B. However,  when the  default
penalty  hits the  two  sectors  differentially,  we have:
dp/=  f(t  T/(T)A-(('N/(  )]-dp/p.  Thus,  in  the  more  general  case,  the  rzal
exchange  rate  p is affected  by the  amount  of debt  serviced.  As  B  rises,  (,(B)
rises,  increasing  the  demand  by the  T sector  for  the  N good  and thus,
increasing  p. However,  (T(B)  also  rise  but  by less  than the  rise in the  N
output,  pushing  p down.  The net  effect  depends  on the  relative  elasticities  of
rT  and (N.-8-
increases  with t, thus  reinforcing  the  effect  of a tax  change  on tax  receipts.
We can  also  rewrite  the  welfare  level  of the  two  groups  of wage earners
in terms  of the  tax  rate t  and the  amount  of debt repaid  B. Clearly,  UT  and  U"
(as  well as  national  income  Y) increase  in  B: given  a tax  rate t,  a hig&ir  debt
repayment  increases  the  welfare  of both  groups  as well as disposable  income
because  the  penalties  are  then  lower.
However,  the  effect  of an increase  in  taxes--gil-en  B--is  perceived
differently  by the  two  groups.  Given  B, the  N sector  is  opposed  to a tax
increase  as its  welfare  level  decreases  in  t. Two  reasons  contribute  to this:  a
tax  increase  lowers  disposable  income,  and it induces  a devaluation  which
further  hurts  N. On the  other  hand,  an increase  in  taxes  has an ambiguous  effect
on T's  welfare.  While  T's  disposable  income  drops  by the  direct  effect,  it is
increased  by the induced  devaluation.  Under  some  appropriate  conditions,  it is
possible  to show that  the  indifference  curves  of  both groups  are convex  in the
space  (B,t),  but that  the  slope  of the  indifference  curve  of the  T group  is
smaller  than  that  of the  N group  at any  point (see  appendix  1).
We have represented  in figure  1 the  function  B(t) in the (B,T)  space  as
a concave  function8  and  the  two  groups  indifference  curves.
Discussion
Figure  1 illustrates  the  choice  of different  types  of governments.  If it
acts in the  sole interest  of the  non-traded  sector,  the  government  will  pick
point  A where  the  welfare  of the  N sector  iJ,  maximized.  At A, the tax  rate  is
low  and  consequently,  debt  repayment  will  be low.  However,  a government  acting
in the  sole interest  of the traded  sector  will choose  a higher  tax  rate at point
B, and  debt  repayment  will  be larger.  Finally,  a government  that is  maximizing
national  income  will  pick an intermediate  policy  at point  C (see  appendix  1).
8It  can  be shown  that  under  appropriate  conditions,  B(t) is  concave.  This will
hold  when  e  is  concave  enough,  ept  is large  enough,  and  t is small  enough.-9-
Put  differently,  there  is  a national  consensus  co repay  an amount  BN of
foreign  debt  and to  devalue  accordingly,  and  a national  consensus  not to  repay
more than  BT.  However,  for  any  repayment  in  between  those  quantities,  there  is  a
conflict  of interest  between  the  two  sectors.  If income  redistribution  was
possible,  then  maximizing  national  income  would  be Pareto  improving.  However,  in
the  absence  of domestic  redistribution,  a government  that  is  maximizing  national
income  will be opposed  by both sectors,  with the  traded  goods  sector  seeking  a
more  pronounced  devaluation  and  a larger  debt  payment,  and the  nt -traded  sector
seeking  the  opposite.  An important  policy  implication  is that  in the  absence  of
redistribution,  a seemingly  neutral  objective  of income  maximization  may  be
quite  difficult  to implement  in  the  face  of the  political  opposition  it would
generate.
II.  Trade  Related  Conflicts  and  Social  Coalitions
In this  section,  we explore  the  conflicts  of interests  that  can  arise-
between  the  factors  of production  employed  in the  export  and  in the import
substitution  sectors.  The  differential  impact  of debt repavment  policy  is  due to
a presumption  of a differential  impact  of the  defa'llt  penalty  on those  sectors.
We embed  our  analysis  in  the  well-known  two-good/two-sector  trade  model
where  labor  is mobile,  but capital  immobile  between  the  two  sectors  (Jones
[1975],  Mussa [1974]).9  Let  K  denote  the  capital  stock  in sector  i,  i-(X,M),
where  X  stands  for  export  and  M for  import,  and  L denote  (fixed)  labor  supply.
Using  Jones'  (1975)  model,  we summarize  the  production  side  of the  economy  with
the  following  equations  describing  the  unit  cost  and factor  balance  conditions:
(5a)  1 -a  rx  +  aLX  w
(5b)  p  - aKM  rM  + aLm  w
9For  the  moment,  we  consider  that  capital  is immobile  internationally,  but we
relax  this  assumption  in the  sequel.-10-
(5c)  axi  Qi  - Ki  i(X,M)
(5d)  a  QM  + au Qx  - L
where  Qx and  QM  are the  outputs  of the  export  and import  sectors,  p is the
relative  price  of the  import  good  to the  export  good faced  by the  country  (the
export  good is taken  as the  numeraire);  ai,  is the  ith  unit-input  coefficient  in
the  production  of the  jth  good (ic(K,L),  jc(X,M));  w is  the  wage rate;  and r  is
the  rental  rate  of capital  in sector  i, ie(X,M).  Equation  (5a)  and (5b)  ensure
zero-profits  in the two  sectors,  and  equations  (5c)  and (5d)  ensure  equilibrium
between  the  demand  for  and  supply  of capital  and labor.
Debt  Repayment  and  Penalties
As above,  suppose  that  the  country  has  an amount  D of external  debt
outstanding.  We assume  that  when it  partially  defaults  and  repays  an amount  B<D,
its  terms  of trade  deteriorate.  This is  meant  to  capture  the  loss  of trade
credit  and  of market  access  incurred  by a defaulting  country.  In  particular,  the
price  of the  iri^portable  good is  assumed  to  be given  by:
(6)  p - p(B)  with p'(B)<O;  p"(B)>O;  p(O)-p.;  and  p(D)-p*<po.
where  p* is the  international  relative  price  of the  importable  good in terms  of
the  export  good.  The country  then  faces  a trade-off  between  debt repayments  and
terms  of trade.  The more  it repays,  the  better  are  its  terms  of trade (in
general,  this  trade-off  may  be discontinuous  as discussed  above).
It  will  be useful  in the  sequel  to  know  how factor  prices  respond  to a
change  in  p. Differentiating  the  system  in (5),  and  using  the  notation  x-dx/x,
we get  aftei  some  manipulations:10
10A  useful  intermediate  result  is:
°  ~ex ?x  +  6=M-11-
(7a)  - p
(7b)  rM  [1._ULM]  P/OKM
(7c)  'r  - 0LX  A/  #  v  ,
where
- AM,M  /  ANeM +  AXeX is  the  elasticity  of demand  of the  wage rate  with respect
to p.
-j  j  is the  elasticity  of demand  for  labor  in industry  J, je(X,M).
oii  is the  distribu  ive share  of input  i in  sector  J, with:  Ox  axxrx,  e6
aLiw,  KM  - aKmrM/p  *OL  =  aLmw/p.
Aj- Lj/L  is the  share  of labor  in industry  J, Je(X,M).
OJ  aI  - a  / [w-r],  jE(X,M),  is  the  elasticity  of substitution  between
capital  and  labor  in industry  j.
The system  in (7)  of course  implies  the  usual  result:  kx  <  O  <  0w  <
<  r,  that  is,  that  an increase  in the  relative  price  of the  importable  good
increases  the  return  on capital  in the  import  sector  but decreases  it in the
export  sector.  The  wage rate  increases  in terms  of the  exportable  good,  but it
decreases  irn  terms  of the  importable  good.
Social  Conflict  over  Debt  Adjustment
For  simplicity,  let  us start  the  analysis  with the  case  where the
government  uses  a  uniform  tax  t on all  the  factors  of production  in order  to
collect  the  resources  that  it  needs  for  debt  service,2  Moreover,  assume  that
preferences  are given  by equation  (1)  where  Yi  represents  the (after  tax) income
of the  three  interest  groups  in  our economy:  the  capitalists  in the  export
0°1-  OMAN  [W  - rI  _aX  AX [ A  X]
"because  M<l.
12We later  relax  this  assumption.-12-
sector  (X),  those  in the import  substitution  sector  (M),  and the  workers  (L).  We
have:  YX-  (1-t)rxKx,  yM_  (l-t)r  KM, and  yL_  (l-t)wL.
It is easy  to show  that--holding  debt  repayment  B constant--an  increase
in the  tax  rate  hurts  the  three  groups  (i.e  BU'/8t<O  ,  ie(X,M,L)).  The effect  of
an increase  in debt  repayment--holding  taxes  constant--is  more  complex.  It is
possible  to show  that:  aUX/8B>O,  6UM/8B<O, and  8UL/8B>O iif  a>A.  The
interpretation  is as follows:  as the  repayment  B increases,  p goes  down (the
terms  of trade  improve),  and  as a result,  the  rental  rate  rx  increases.  Thus,
capitalists  in the  export  sector  unambiguously  gain.  The capitalists  in the
import  substitution  sector  are  hurt  because  the  return  on their  factor  of
production,  rm,  is  reduced  by more than  p. For labor,  the  effect  of a drop in p
is  ambiguous,  because  the  wage rate  decreases  by an amount  proportionally
smaller  than  thte  drop in  p (since  p<l).  The  net effect  will be positive  (the
real  consumption  wage  w/E  will increase)  only  when  a, the  share  of imports  in
consumption  is  higher  than  1, the  elasticity  of the  wage  with respect  to p.
It is  now  possible  to  show  that  in the  space  (B,t),  the  slopes  of the
indifference  locus  of the  capitalists  are  well defined  while  that  of the  workers
is ambiguous.  For the  X-capitalists,  the  indifference  locus  slopes  up,  while it
slopes  down for  the  IS-capitalists.  For  the  workers,  the  indifference  curve  will
slope  up if the  share  of import  in  consumption  is large  enough.  Moreover,  when
positive,  this  slope  is  larger  than that  of the  X-capitalists'  indifference
curve  at all  points  (see  appendix  2).
We can  also  represent  graphically  the  debt service  possibility  curve.
The government  budget  constraint  is  given  by B - tY(p),  where  Y(p) is  national
income  given  by:
(8)  Yp)  -wL + rxKx  + rmm-  Qx  + pQm-13-
It is  possible  to show  that  B(t) is generally  concave  (see  appendix  2).
The  basic  intuition  is that  an increase  in t increases  debt  service  by less  than
Y, because  of the  adverse  price  effect  which  tends  to reduce  the  tax  base.
Equipped  with the  debt  service  possibility  curve  and the  indifference
curves  of the  different  constituencies,  we can  analyze  the  possible  social
coalitions  that  can emerge.  These  will  be crucially  depend  on the  share  of
import  in  labor's  consumption  basket.  The  case  where  labor  lose from  a rise  in p
(a<s)  is  simple:  workers  as well  as the  IS-capitalists  are against  any  amount  of
debt  repayments  as their  preferred  policy  is t-O  and  B-O.  However,  the  X-
capitalists  favor  some  adjustment  (t*,B*).  Thus,  there  is a zone  of social
conflict  between  t=O  and  t*,  with  a possible  coalition  between  labor  and the  IS-
capitalists  against  the  X-capitalists.
However,  when the  share  imports  is  large  enough  in the  workers
consumption  basket  (a>M),  the  debt  adjustment  trade-offs  facing  each interest
group  is  somewhat  different  and  it is depicted  in figure  2. In this  case,  labor
also  prefers  some  adjustment  t*.  But  labor's  preferred  adjustment  falls  short
of the  X-capitalists'  preferred  adjustment  tf.  And again,  the  IS-capitalists
are  against  any  adjustment.  As a result,  the  constellations  of potential  social
conflicts  are  now  quite  different:  in the  zone tO,t*),  labor's  interests
converge  with those  of the  X-capitalists.  Both  would  be willing  to  join in the
effort  against  the  IS-capitalists  in favor  of stronger  adjustment.  In the  zone
(t*,  tt),  it is the  interests  of labor  and  the  IS-capitalists  that  converge  as
they  would  both gain  from  a lower  adjustment  effort  than  the  X-capitalists.
Finally,  there  is a social  consensus  not to  adjust  beyond  tf.
Differential  Taxes
The  above  results  can  be altered  when the  different  interest  groups  are
taxed  differently,  although  the  underlying  logic  is  similar.  Suppose  that  only
one  group  is taxed.  If labor  alone  is  taxed,  two  types  of social  coalitions  can-14-
emerge,  depending  on the  tax  rate  under  consideration  and  on the  share  of
imported  goods  in the  consumption  basket.  In all  cases,  the  X-capitalists  favor
full  repayment.  When the tax  rate  is too  high  and the  share  of import  low, the
interests  of labor  and  of the  IS-capitalists  converge.  However,  for  smaller  tax
rates,  and  when import  shares  are  large,  both labor  and  the  X-capitalists  will
favor  an increased  tax,  against  the  will of the  IS-capitalists.
When the  tax fall  solely  on the  IS-capitalists,  they  will  be opposed  to
any adjustment  while those  of the  X-sectors  will favor  full adjustment  again.
Social  coalitions  thus  depend  on the  position  of labor.  With a high import  share
in  consumption,  labor  will join forces  with the  X-capitalists  for  full
repayment,  whereas  with a low  import  share,  they  would  gain  by supporting  the
demands  of the  IS-capitalists  for  full  default.
Finally,  when the  tax  falls  on the  X-capitalists,  this group  will in
general  favor  some  partial  repayment.  The interests  of labor  will again  depend
on the  share  of imports  in  consumption  (with  this  share  large  enough,  workers
support  full  repayment),  while  the  IS-capitalists  will  maintain  their  opposition
to any  repayment.  Thus,  a coalition  between  all  capitalists  against  labor  to
oppose  large  repayments  might  result,
Capital  Flight  Considerations
The analysis  is  deeply  affected  when  we allow  for  international  capital
mobility.  Since  it is  the  capital  of the IS  sector  that  has incentives  to fly
away  during  the  adjustment  process,  consider  the  case  where  the  IS capital  is
mobile.  Given  an international  return  on capital  of R, the  after-tax  return  in
the  IS sector  cannot  be decreased  below  R.13  Rather,  when taxes  are too  high,
quantities  will adjust.  This  adds  a restriction  to the  equilibrium  conditions:
13
However,  when (l-t)rM  > R, there  are  no capital  inflows  because  of credit
rationing.-15-
(9)  (l-t)rm  2 R  and  Os km  s KM
where  km  refers  to the  IS capital  that  remains  domestically.  When (9)  is
binding,  kM  is determined  according  to:
(10)  (l-t)  rM =  R.
Of course,  this  affects  the  comparative  statics  around  the  equilibria.
Instead  of the  system  in (7),  we now  have:
(lla)  w  - (p/B>)  - (e>/B>)(dt/l-t)
(llb)  rM  (AO  (A/&  +  (6X+M/AM)  (dt/l  t)]
(110)  >$Mg  (AXeX+@>M,\Mc)(-/OLM)  (\XeX+,\MeM)(OM/5M)(dt/1-t)
Equation  (llc)  indicates  that  a drop  in p (resulting  from  an increase  in
debt  service  B)  induces  capital  flight  in  the  import  sector  (dK./dB<O).
Similarly,  an increase  in taxes  t also  induces  capital  flight  (dKm/dt<O).
Capital  flight  in turn  affects  the  profitability  of capital  in the  export  sector
and  the  wage  rate in equilibrium.  But  in  contrast  to the  case  without  capital
mobility,  the  wage rate  w decreases  in terms  of the  exportable  good  when p rises
(equation  lla).  This is due  to two  effects:  for  a given  KM,  there  is a reduction
in the  demand  for  labor  in the  IS sector;  and since  KM is  reduced  by capital
flight,  there  is  a further  depressing  effect  on the  demand  for  labor.  14 The
important  consequence  is that  with  perfect  capital  mobility,  labor  is  always
opposed  to adjustment  when  capital  flight  occurs,  irrespective  of the  share  of
export  in the  consumption  basket.
In contrast,  capital  in the  export  sector  is favorably  affected  by
14Mathematically,  this  is because  w/p>l  since  9><l.-16-
capital  mobility  as rx  is  now increasing  in the  tax rate  t (equation  llb).  This
is due  to th)  fact that  an increase  in t generates  capital  flight  which
depresses  wages (in  terms  of exportables).  As a result,  profitability  rises. 15
Finally,  capitalists  in the  IS sector  are  now  marginally  indifferent  to debt
policy  since  their  revenue  remains  unaffected  by both Ap and  by At.
III.  Government  Objectives,  Multiple  Equilibria  and capital  Flight
The  analysis  above  of the  relationship  between  distributional  conflicts  and  the
willingness  of governments  to  adjust  to  a debt  overhang--while  giving  rise  to
several  intuitive  propositions--can  be criticized  on two  major  grounds:
(i)  First,  the  analysis  above  cannot  be easily  reconciled  with an ex-
ante  optimal  tax  system.  For  example,  why would  capitalists  wait for  a debt
crisis  to raise  taxes  on labor?  Allowing  for  an ex-ante  optimal  (in  some  sense)
tax  system  would  alter  the  analysis.  To expand  on the  above  example,  if the
exploitation  of labor  was ex-ante  as  high as it  can  get, the  burden  of the  debt
crisis  would  have to  be fully  born  by the  capitalists  themselves.  Moreover,
social  goals  are generally  affected  by national  wealth,  and it is  not  possible
in general  to separate  the  size  of the  economic  pie  from its  distribution.
(ii)  Second,  the  models  analyzed  above  are  not  dynamic.  Capital  flight
was assumed  to take  place  after  a government  commits  to tax  capital.  More
generally  however,  it is likely  that  differences  in the  domestic  private  sector
expectations  of future  government  actions  can  constrain  different  types  of
governments  differently.  Equilibria  driven  by expectations  has  been recently
studied  in the  context  of public  debt  crises  by Helpman  (1988),  Eaton  (1987),
and Calvo  (1988).  The  premise  of those  analyses  is that  governments  are  expected
to tax  capital  in  order  to fully  service  public  debts.16  However,  when the
15ln extreme  cases,  it  may even  be possible  now that  the  after  tax  return  (1-
tSrx  increases  in t.
1bIn  the  capital  flight  models  of  Helpman  and  Eaton,  the flight  of one
capitalist  raises  the  tax  obligation  of other  capitalists,  increasing  their
incentives  to invest  abroad.  As a result,  "equilibrium  may involve  all-17-
default  penalty  is  elastic  enough,  this  need  not  always  be the  case,  even in an
optimizing  framework.  In fact,  the  shape  of the  government's  reaction  function
is then  crucially  dependent  on the  weights  attached  to the  welfare  of various
types  of taxpayers.
Below,  we present  an example  that  can  shed light  on some  of the  possible
complications  these  considerations  add  to the  analysis.  In this  example,  only
capitalists  are taxed,  so that  capitalists  would  a-priori  want to default  more
than  labor.  However,  due  to time  consistency  problems  and to implicit  links
between  social  preferences  and  wealth,  an equilibrium  in  which  a pro-capitalist
government  default  less  than  a pro-labor  government  emerges.
An example  vith rational  expectations  and  multiple  equilibria
Consider  a singe-sector  economy  with  N individuals.  We index  individuals
by the  share  of domestic  capital  they  own.  Each  individual  is  endowed  with one
unit of labor  (whose  wage is given  by w),  and  ki  percent  of aggregate  capital  K,
icN.  The  higher  ki,  the  richer  individual  i is.  Total  domestic  capital  K is
either  already  invested  in real  assets  (R),  or free (K-R),  and free  capital
can  be invested  either  abroad  (F),  or domestically  (I  - K-a-F).  Domestic
investment  yields  a fix  rate  of return  r.  1 But there  is  a tax  t on domestic
returns,  leaving  a net  return  of (l-t)r.  Foreign  investment  yields  R and  cannot
be taxed.  The  net (after  tax)  domestic  income  of individual  i is therefore  given
by:
capitalists  investing  domestically  and  the  public  foreign  loans  repaid,  or all
investing  abroad  with  government  insolvency  and  default  on foreign  loans  the
possible  consequence"  (Eaton  1987).  In the  public  debt  model  of Calvo  (1988),
another  channel  of instability  arises  due to the  effect  of default  expectation
on the  cost  of refinancing  the  public  debt.  Expectations  of future
expropriations  lead  to a  higher  cost  of capital  and  precipitate  a forced
default.  However,  other  equilibria  can  exist  with expectations  of full
repayment,  low  borrowing  costs  and  as a result,  no default.
1Production  is  competitive  and  uses capital  and labor.  For  simplicity,  we
take  a linear  p:oduction  function:  x  (K - F) r  +  w L. In a competitive
equilibrium,  r  and  w are  also the  wages  of capital  and  labor.-18.
(12)  Yi - (1-t)  ki (K-F)  r + w.
Suppose  that  the  country  has  an amount  D of external  debt outstanding.
We assume  that  when it  partially  defaults  and  repays  an amount  B<D, the  costs  of
(partial)  default  are  proportional  to the  amount  defaulted  on. In  particular,
assume  that  the  value  of domestic  output  is reduced  by a penalty  that  is
proportional  to the  amount  of repudiated  debt.  As a result,  individual
consumption  is  given  by:  mi  - yj/f(B)  where  ((B)  represents  a default  penalty.
We take  t(O)  -y >  1,  ((D)  1,  ('(B)  s 0  and  ("(B)  >  0.
Utility  functions  are  given  by Ui(mi),  with  U' >  0 and  U" <  0. The
government  is  assumed  to  optimize  over a  welfare  function  W(.) that  weights
individual  utility  functions  in  a certain  fashion.  In particular,  we take:
(13)  W(a) - Z 7Y  Ui.
where  -yi  [akj+(l-a)n]  are the  social  weights  used  by an  a-government  (where
Osasl,  ki  (Rj+Ij)/(?1+I),  ne-/N,  and ieN). 18 A government  that is  more pro-
capital  uses a  higher  weight  for  capital,  a. The  total  tax  collection,  T, is
used entirely  for  debt service:
(14)  T - t(I+k)r - B.
The amount  of taxation  is  determined  optimally  by the  government  who trades  off
its  costs--in  terms  of disutility--against  tCe  cost  of  non-repayment.  As we show
18Note  that  weights  are  assigned  after  capital  flight  took  place.  Politicians
represent  domestic  interests.  So some  capitalists  may  have now  became  more of
a worker  in terms  of domestic  weights.-19-
beiow,  the  optima.  tax  and  repayment  policy  crucially  depends  on the  type  of
government,  a.
The  sequence  of moves  is  as follows.  First,  a government  -ype  is
announced.  Capital  is then  allocated  between  domestic  and foreign  investments
given  tax  expectations.19  A tax  t on capital  is then instituted,  and  production
takes  place.  Finally,  the  government  collects  taxes  to service  debt (we  impose  T
B);  the  extent  of the  debt service  B determines  the  penalty  f(B),  afnd
consumption  take  place.  To solve  this  game,  we start  with the  last  period.
Ex-Post  Tax Determination
The government  seeks  to  find t*  that  maximizes  W given  domestic
investment.  The first  order  condition  of this  problem  can  be determined  by
differentiating  W with respect  to t.  Rearranging  terms  and setting  to zero,  we
have:
(15)  W,  E  (  y7U'fq'm'  +  ki])  o  0
which says  that  the  optimal  tax  trades  off the  weighted  sum  of marginal  costs
and  benefits  of all  individuals.  The  benefit  of an additional  dollar  of debt
repayment  is a  marginal  improvement  in  consumption,  leading  to a  marginal  gain
of -_'mi  for  individual  i.  The  marginal  cost is the  additional  tax  burden  of k 1
for individual  i.  This  problem  generally  possesses  an interior  solution  t*(a).
Given  a, 0  < a  <1, there  is  an  medium  agent  for  whom t*(a)  is optimal,
i.e,  for  whom -'m' - k'.  Poorer  agents  will find  t* too  low  relative  to their
own  preferred  level,  (and  they  will receive  a net  social  subsidy  [-('m'  - ki]  <
0) as they  value  the  benefit  of debt  repayment  more  than  their  share  of the  cost
of repayment.  Conversely,  richer  agents  would  prefer  less taxes  and less  debt
l9For  simplicity,  we assume  that  capital  becomes  trapped  once invested  in  real
assets..20-
repayments  (because  they  pay  a net social  tax [-(,m-  ki]  > 0)  .2  Thus,  it
should  not  be surprising  to find  that  t* generally  decreases  in  a, the  weight
attached  to capital  (appendix  3).
More interesting  is the  issue  cf the  determinants  of the  government's
reaction  to a change  in domestic  investment.  Because  W,t<0  by the  second  order
condition  (see  appendix  3),  we have sign (8t*/8I]  - sign[  WUt],  with:
(16)  I  =  UI))  (yiU'"mitr)  +  Z  EyU"(8m'/8I)(-C'm  -k  )!
where  am1/lI  - [(l-t)k'/t  - ('m'](rt/() > 0  for all ieN.
As domestic  investment  increases,  three  effects  determine  the  way in
which  the  government  alters  the  tax  t* (ex-post).  First,  a wealth  effect--
represented  by the first  term  in  equation  (16)--creates  incentives  to increase
t* and  debt  repayment.  Higher  domestic  investment  implies  higher  future  domestic
consumption.  As  a resul* the  desirability  of a reduction  in the  consumption
penalty  rises,  and  with  t the  desirability  of a larger  debt  repayment.  This
effect  is larger  for  capital  rich individuals,  and  thus,  the  aggregate  effect  is
larger  when  a  is large.
However,  the  wealth  effect  is  somewhat  reduced  by the  fact  that there  is
decreasing  return  to debt  repayments.  This  second  effect  is  represented  by the
second  term  in (16).  A rise in investment  increases  total  tax  collection,
holding  t* fixed.  This  reduces  the  consumption  penalty.  But since  the  marginal
benefit  of consumption  is falling,  large  debt repayment  become  less  attractive
at the  margin,  calling  for  a drop  in the  tax  rate.  This effect  is  weak  when the
20Formally,  this  holds  when:  d/dt[-e'm'-k'][(k'k/()-Ml(("-_('2g))<0;  a
sufficiant  condition  is that  ((.)  is sufficiently  convex.-21-
default  penalty  is  not  very responsive  to changes  in debt  repayments.
Finally,  as domestic  investment  increases,  the  optimal  extent  of income
redictributions  changes.  This is captured  by the  third  term  in (16).  The
increase  in  domestic  wealth  changes  the  way in  which  all  agents  value  at the
margin  their  net  social  contribution.  As all individuals  get  richer,  the  capital
rich  individuals  attach  a smaller  cost  to  being taxed,  and this  makes  society
"fairer"  (i.e,  more redistributive).  But  at the  same  time,  the  capital  poor
individuals  attach  now a smaller  benefit  to the  net  subsidy  they  receive,  which
favors  less  redistribution.  The  net  effect  on social  welfare  depends  heavily  on
the  social  weights,  and thus  on  a. The larger  a, the  larger  the  first  effect,
which  call for  an increase  in the  tax  rate (conversely,  when  a  is large  and I is
reduced,  the  socially  optimal  tax  rate  will  tend  to drop).
In  sum, the  function  t*(I,.)  can  be either  increasing  or decreasing.  The
usual  case for  a decreasing  reaction  function  will hold  when  a, the  social
weight  plased  on capital,  is low,  and  wl.=n  the  marginal  cost  of non-repayment  of
the  debt is large.  However,  when  a  is large  and  when the  marginal  cost of
default  is insensitive  to  the  size  of the  repayment,  a government  may  well want
to  reduce  taxes  on capital  when the  capital  base shrinks.
Investment,  Expected  Taxes  and  EquilibriA
In this  simple  set-up,  investment  depends  on the  expected  futtire  tax
rate to.  All the  free  financial  capital  is  invested  domestically  when (l-t*)  r 2
R, i.e  when t'  s 1-  R/r.  Otherwise,  all  the  financial  capital  flees  abroad,  and
only  I  remains  trapped  domestically.  This defines  I*(to),  a non  continuous
decreasing  function.
In a rational  expectations  equilibrium,  two  conditions  must  be
21A typical  case is  when the  cost  of default  are  infinite.  In this  case,  the
government's  problem  has no interior  solution,  and  the  government  has no
choice  but to attempt  to repay  the  whole  debt.  So its  sets  t* - D/I,  implying
that  ex-post,  8t*/8I  - -D/I < 0.-22-
satisfied:  t*-t*(I)  and  I*(te)-I.  In figura  3,  we have  plotted  the  two  cases
that  correspond  to  an increasing  and  a decreasing  government  reaction  function
t*(I).  With low  enough  a  and/or  high i",  t*(I)  is a decreasing  function.  As a
result,  two  equilibria  can  arise.  The first  one,  represented  by point  A,
corresponds  to  a case  of relatively  low (expectea)  taxes,  no capital  flight,  and
high debt  repayment.  The  second  at point  B corresponds  to a case  of high
(expected)  taxes,  complete  flight  of financial  capital,  and  low  debt  repayment.
In  both cases,  expectations  are  self  fulfilling.  Thus,  the  adjustment  policies
of pro-middle  class  governments  will  depend  heavily  on the  expectations  of the
holders  of financial  capital.
However,  with a high  enough  a, and/or  a low  enough  (n,  t*(I)  is an
increasing  function.  As a result,  the  equilibrium--at  C--is  unique.  In
equilibrium,  the  tax  rate is lower  than  at A (because  a  is larger),  there  is no
capital  flight,  and  debt  repayment  is larger  than  in the  bad equilibrium  of a
less  pro-capital  government.
IV.  Politics  and  Bargaining
We have argued  above  that  governments  that  value  highly  the  costs  of
default  (i.e,  those  with export  promotion  constituencies)  and that  do not  value
highly  the  cost of repayment  (those  with  constituencies  from the  traded  goods
sectors)  service  their  foreign  debt  more  promptly  in order  to reduce  their
default  penalties.  This arguments  extend  easily  to a  world  where  a  bargain  is
u'ltimately  reached  with the  creditors  and  the  default  penalties  are  not  imposed.
In such  a perfect  bargaining  framework,  it should  be of no surprise  to find that
the  identity  of the  government  that  sits  on the  negotiating  table  matters,  with
pro-non-traded  and  pro-import  substitution  governments  securing  better  deals
than  governments  with  more at stake  with trade.
To illustrate  the  effect  of perfect  bargaining  on debt  repayment
policies,  consider  the  dependent  economy  model  of section  I. Suppose  that  when-23-
the  negotiations  between  the  two  parties  fail  to  produce  an agreement,  the
debtor  country  makes  an optimal  partial  repayment  that  trades  off  sanctions
against  repayment,  but that  if  an agreement  is reached,  sanctions  are  not
applied  and  the  creditors  forgive  (or  refinance)  the  unpaid  debt.
Now imagine  that  a government  representing  the  interests  of the  non-
traded  sector  (GN) is  negotiating.  If  negotiations  are  broken,  the  best that  can
be achieved  is a utility  level  of UN  (BN,t*)  (A in figure  1).  However,  the
country  would  be willing  to repay  (and  thus  tax)  more in  exchange  for  a lifting
of the  sanctions.  In particular,  let (  N,rN) represent  a tax  rate  and associated
repayment  that  leave  GN indifferent  between  an efficient  deal (with  no sanctions
imposed)  and  no deal.  Thus,  rN is  defined  by:  U (B*,t*)-(l-rN)qN/E(p)-UN(?N).
The set  of deals  that  are  acceptable  to  banks  and to  GN are given  by:
(17)  XN  (  (  I  t*r rN and  r  ry(r)
where  y is  national  income  without  sanctions  (given  by y - qT  +  pqN).  A similar
analysis  defines  the  set  of possible  deals  between  GT  and  its  creditors:
(18)  XT  I(  t,r)  |  t<TtT  and  p  ry(r)
In figure  4, the  bargains  that  GT  and  G.  can  secure  are compared.  The
no-sanction  debt  possibility  curve  6(r)  is  above  the  curve  with sanctions  B(t).
The  bargaining  zones  XT  and  XN  are  represented  by the  segments  DTCT  and  DNC".  The
government  Gi  would  want to  be as  close  as possible  to Di,  and creditors  will
want to  be as close  as possible  to Ci,  i-(T,N). 22
As expected,  the  bargaining  zone  of GN includes  deals  that  are  more
favorable  to the  debtor  country  than  all  the  possible  deals  that  GT could
22It  is easy  to show  that  6N<8T*-24-
possibly  secure.  But  more interesting  is that  there  might  exist  a zone  of
posslble  deals  DTCN  which  represents  a Pareto  improvement  for  all the  groups  (T,
N and  the  banks)  over all  possible  allocations  with unilateral  action  by the
debtor,  Such  deals  can  arise  when a government  negotiates  with the  banks  under
che  constraint  that  its  opposition  must  be as  well off  as in the  status-quo.  In
this  sense,  opposition  at  home can  be a  blessing  for  debt  negotiators. 23
V. Conclusions
We have  argued  that  domest!z  politics  are  an important  determinant  of
external  debt  policy.  In particular,  our  analysis  indicates  that:
(i)  Governments  backed  by constituencies  from  the  non-traded  good sectors  of the
economy  will tend  to  default  more;
(ii)  Without  capital  mobility,  capitalists  in the  import-substitution  sectors
will tend  to oppose  the  repayment  sought  by the  capitalists  of the  export
sectors;  workers  interests  will  depend  on the  share  of import  in their
consumption  basket;
(iii)  With capital  mobility,  labor  will oppose  the  extent  of debt  repayment
sought  by capitalists  in  both the  export  and the  import  substitution  sectors;
(iv)  Self-fulfilling  external  default  with large  capital  flight  is  more likely
to occur  when the  default  penalty  is inelastic  and  when  a left  wing government
is in  power;
(v)  with perfect  bargaining,  governments  with constituencies  that  oppose  large
debt  repayments  get  a better  debt  settlement.
23Good  examples  of this  phenomenon  are  the  last  Venezuelan  rescheduling
agreement  (that  followed  street  riots  over  price  increases)  and  the  recent
Mexican  debt  relief  agreement  (that  followed  an  very  close  election  victor;  by
the  leading  party).  In  both  cases,  the  perception  by the  banks  that there  was
a strong  domestic  opposition  to  a meager  deal  seemed  to  have played  to the
advantage  of the  debtor.-25-
Appendix  1
Indifference  maps.  Differentiating  (2),  we obtain:
(Al)  dp/p  - -dt/(l-t)[l-a(l-t)-s],  with  A-a'p/a
To find  the  slopes  of the indifference  curves,  differentiate  (1)  for  each of the
two  groups:
dU  T/U-T  'dB/d  - dt/(l-t) - adp/p
Setting  to  zero and  using (Al),  we get:
dB |(B)  [ 1  - a/[l - a(l-t)  -1]
(A2)  --  ----------------------------  2  0  when  a<(l-p)/2,
dt  UT  ('(B)  (l-t)
Similarly:
dB |(B)  [1  +  (l-aMl-a(l-0-0)
(A3)  - - -------------------  O.
dt  UN  ('(B)  (l-t)
Define  R  Y/E(p),  the  real  disposable  income.  We can compute:
dB  (1-a-A)
(A4)  --  --  -------------  2 0  since  u<O.
dt  R  lt[-(-)]
It is easy  to check  that:
(A5)  dB/dtIUN  >  dB/dt|R>  dB/dtIU T
It  can also  be shown  that  the iso-utility  curves  are  convex  when ((B) is
sufficiently  concave.
Appendix  2
From  equation  (1),  we can  derive  the  indifference  locus  for  the  three  groups:
(Al)  aB/atl  B/c(1-t)[p(OLX/OX=)+E  p/E]>O
(A2)  aB/8tJ=  B/e(l-t)[((l-MOLx)/OK)  - E'p/E]<O,  since  [(l-pOLX)/9X]>
I()M  and  E'p/E  <1
(A3)  aB/atl  - B/e(1-t)[E'p/E-y]>0  >0 iif  E'p/E>A.-26-
IUL
where e--(8p/8B)(B/p)  is the  opposite  of the  elasticity  of the  penalty  with,
respect  to the  amount  of debt  repaid.
From the  above  equations,  it is easy  to  verify  that  w'.en  dB/dt  evaluated  at  UL
is  positive,  then  aB/8t(UL)>6B/8t(UX).  Conversely,  when  aB/8t(UL)<O,  then
OB/at(UL)<8B/8t(UX).
Finally,  using  (18),  we can  derive:
(A4)  dB/dt - Y(p(B))/[l-tQMp'(B)J  < Y(p(B)) - B/t.
which  implies  that  B(t) is  concave  for  small  enough  t.
Appendix  3
To see that,  differentiate  (4)  to get:  Ot*/Oa  - - /Wtt.  Because  the
denominator  is  negative,  the  expression  has the  same  sign  as the  numerator.
(W,t  - rI Z  {1'  U'(-("  mi))  + (rI/C)  Z  {(7  U-tC'm'  + k  ]2) < 0 ).  The  numerator  is
given  by:  Wt - {  ((ki  n) U' [-C'm'  - ks]).  For  poor individuals,  the term  in
parenthesis  is negative,  the  term  in  brackets  is  positive,  and  thus,  the  product
is  negative  (and  vice-versa  for  rich individuals).  Thus,  Wt is  negative  when
the  middle  class  is  small  enough.-27-
References
Alesina  A. and  G. Tabellini,  1989.  "External  Debt,  Capital  Flight  and  Political
Risk".  Journal  of International-Economics,  27:3/4.
Berg  A. and  J. Sachs,  1988.  "The  Debt Crisis:  Structural  Explanations  of Country
Performance."  Journal  of Development  Economics.
Bulow,  Jeremy,  and  Kenneth  Rogoff.  1989.  "A Constant  Recontracting  Model  of
Sovereign  Debt."  Journal  of Political  Economy.
Diwan,  Ishac,  forthcoming.  "Linking  Trade  and  Debt Strategies."  Journal  of
International  Economics.
Dornbush,  R. 1973.  "Devaluation,  Money  and  Non-Traded  Goods."  American  Economic
Review.
Dornbush,  R and  S Edwards.  1989."The  Macroeconomics  of Populism  in  Latin
America."  PPR  working  paper  316.  The  World  Bank.
Calvo,  G. 1988.  "Servicing  the  Public  Debt:  The  Role  of Expectations."  American
Economic  Review,  78,  4, pp. 647-661.
Eaton,  J. 1987.  "Public  Debt  Guarantees  and  Private  Capital  Flight."  The  World
Bank Economic  Review,  1, 3,  pp. 377-96.
Fernandez,  R. and  R. Rosenthal.  1988.  "Sovereign  Debt  Renegotiation:  A Strategic
Analysis."  NBER  Working  Paper  2597.
Haggard  S. and  R. Kaufman.  1988.  "The  Politics  of Stabilization  and Structural
Adjustment."  In Sachs,  ed.  Developing  Country  Debt  and  Economic  Performance.  The
University  of Chicago  Press  (pp.209-25).
Helpman,  E. 1988.  "Debt  Relief:  Incentives  and  Welfare."
Jones,  R.W. 1975.  "Income  Distribution  and  Effective  Protection  in a
Multicommodity  Trade  Model."  Journal  of Economic  Theory,  11, 1-15.
Lipson,  C. 1986.  "International  Debt  and  International  Institutions."  in  M.
Kahler  ed.  The Politics  of International  Debt,  Cornell  University  Press.
Mayer,  W. 1984.  "Endogenous  Tariff  Formation."  American  Economic  Review.
74,5:970-85.
Mussa,  M. 1974.  "Tariff  and  Distribution  of Income:  Importance  of Factor
Specificity,  Substitutability  and  Intensity  in the  Short  and  Long  Run."  Journal
of Political  Economy,  82:1191-1204.
Rodrik,  D. 1987.  "The  Welfare  Economics  of Debt  Service".  Manuscript.
Sachs,  J. 1988.  "Social  Conflicts  and  Populist  Policies  in  Latin  America."  NBER



















K  --  .&,~  ~to:m  - - - m 









4  ____\t~t  I
I  I
/  I  I
,'1/  ,.  I
O'  t(T-  )  XI
mm  t~I 
-A 
,~~~~~~~~~~-  - - -
EM  ,
£~~~tI  N
I  1 ;  - AO  I|
I  I
I  I
I  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~I 
I  I
1  1  d~1
I  I
I  I
I  man.  [  nr  aiPRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
A±r  ~mfor  paper
WPS632 The  Macroeconomics  of  the  Public  Carlos  Alfredo  Rodriguez Match  1991  R. Luz
Sector  Deficit:  The  Case  of  Argentina  34303
WPS633 The  Macroeconomics  of  the  Public  Virabongse  Ramangkura March  1991  R. Luz
Sector  Deficit:  The  Case  of  Thailand Bhanupongse  Nidhiprabha  34303
WPS634 Trends  In  Developing  Country  Bela  Balassa  March  1991  WDR  Office
Exports,  1963-88  31393
WPS635 Exchange  Rates  and  Foreign  Trade  Bela  Balassa  March  1991  C. Cuskelly-Young
in  Korea  39413
WPS636 Economic  Integration  in Eastern  Bela  Balassa  March  1991  C. Cuskelly-Young
Europe  39413
WPS637 Poverty  in Poland,  1978-88  Branko  Milanovic  March  1991  WDR  Office
31393
WPS638 Researching  the  Trade-Productivity  James  Tybout  March  1991  D. Ballantyne
Link:  New  Directions  37947
WPS639 The  High  Cost  of  Protecting  Wendy  E.  Takacs  March  1991  D. Ballantyne
Uruguay's  Automotive  Industry  37947
WPS640 The  Impact  of  Policy  in  African  William  Jaeger  March  1991  A. Yideru
Agriculture:  An  Empirical  Investigation  34663
WPS641 Intertemporal  Substitution  in  Karsten  N. Pedersen  April  1991  M.  Hileman
Consumption:  Evidence  for  Some  31284
High-  and  Middle-income  Countries
WPS642 How  a Change  in  Brazil's  Sugar  Brent  Borrell  April  1991  A. Kitson-Walters
Policies  Would  Affect  the  World  33712
Sugar  Market
WPS643 Regional  Integration  among  Andras  lnotai  April  1991  D. Ballantyne
Developing  Countries,  Revisited  37947
WPS644 Trade  and  Payments  Arrangements Constantine  Michalopoulos  April  1991  M.  Colinet
in Post-CMEA  Eastem  and  Central  David  Tarr  34698
Europe
WPS645 Poverty,  Policy,  and  Industrializa-  Ben  Polak  April  19t,  WDR  Office
tion: Lessons  from  the  Distant  Past  Jeffrey  G. Williamson  31393
WPS646 The Developmental  Effectiveness  Tony  Killick  April  1991  S.  King-Watson
of Aid  to Africa  33730
WPS647 Growth  Rates  and  Aggregate  Nanak  Kakwani  April  1991  B.  Rosa
Welfare:  An  International  Comparison  33751PRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Auh  Dog  for  paper
WPS648 Who  Paid  the  Bill? Adjustment  and  M.  Louise  Fox  April  1991  WDR  Office
Poverty  in Brazil,  1980-95  Samuel  A.  Morley  31393
WPS649 An  Observation  on  the  Bias  in  Margaret  E.  Grosh  April  1991  B.  Diallo
Clinic-based  Estimates  of  Kristin  Fox  30997
Malnutrition  Rates  Maria  Jackson
WPS650 Administrative  Valuation  of  Soviet  Karen  Brooks  April  1991  C.  Spooner
Agricultural  Land:  Results  Using  30464
Lithuanian  Production  Data
WPS651 Taxation  of  Financial  Assets  In  Christophe  Chamley  April  1991  A.  Bhalla
Developing  Countries  37699
WPS652 Demographic  Response  to Economic  Kenneth  Hill  April  1991  WDR  Office
Shock  31393
WPS653 The  Effects  of  Option-Hedging  on  the  Donald  F.  Larson  April  1991  D. Gustafson
Costs  of Domestic  Price  Stabilization  Jonathan  Coleman  33714
Schemes
WPS654 Reflections  on  Credit  Policy  in  Mansoor  Dailami  April  1991  M.  Raggambi
Developing  Countries:  Its Effect  on  Marcelo  Glugale  37657
Private  Investment
WPS655 Interest  Rate  Policy  in  Egypt:  Its  Mansoor  Dailami  April  1991  M.  Raggambi
Role  in Stabilization  and  Adjustment Hinh  T.  Dinh  37657
WPS656 Relative  Deprivation  and  Migration:  Oded  Stark  April  1991  M.  Felix
Theory,  Evidence,  and  Policy  J. Edward  Taylor  . 33724
Implications
WPS657 Distributional  Aspects  of Debt  Ishac  Diwan  April  1991  S. King-Watson
Adjustment  Thierry  Verdier  33730